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Abstract 
Unlike the constitutions of other African countries such as Uganda, South Africa, Kenya, 
Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Namibia which expressly provide for grounds on which a person 
may not be discriminated against, the Constitution of Seychelles, although prohibits 
discrimination, does not provide for grounds on which a person may not be discriminate 
against. Article 27 of the Constitution of Seychelles provides for the right to equal protection 
of the law. In this article, the author analyses the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeal of Seychelles to illustrate how these courts have dealt with the following 
issues: defining ‘equal protection of the law’ and ‘discrimination’ and giving the grounds on 
which a person may not be discriminated against, alleging discrimination, locus standi to 
challenge discriminatory laws or programmes and permissible discrimination. The author 
recommends, inter alia, that the Constitution may have to be amended to enumerate the 
grounds on which a person may not be discriminated against. 
 
Introduction 
Unlike the Constitutions of other African countries such as Uganda,1 South Africa,2 
Kenya,3 Mauritius,4 Zimbabwe5 and Namibia6  which expressly provide for grounds on 
which a person may not be discriminated against, the Constitution of Seychelles, although 
prohibits discrimination, does not provide for grounds on which a person may not be 
discriminate against. Article 27 of the Constitution of Seychelles provides for the right to 
equal protection of the law in the following terms: 
 
1. Every person has a right to equal protection of the law including the enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms set out in this Charter without discrimination on any ground except as is 
necessary in a democratic society. 
2. Clause (1) shall not preclude any law, programme or activity which has as its object 
the amelioration of the conditions of disadvantaged persons or groups. 
 
Twomey has argued that Article 27(1) provides for ‘the right to be free from all forms of 
discrimination’.7 In the preamble to the Constitution of Seychelles, the people of 
Seychelles reaffirm that the rights provided in the Constitution ‘include the rights of the 
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individual to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness free from all types of discrimination’. 
Apart from Article 27, other constitutional provisions also prohibit discrimination.8 The 
right to freedom from discrimination is also provided for in the regional and international 
human rights instruments ratified or acceded to by Seychelles.9 These include the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,10 the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child11 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.12 In their 
endeavour to protect the right to equal protection of the law, Seychellois courts, in 
particular, the Supreme Court13 and the Court of Appeal,14 have dealt with the following 
issues: defining discrimination, providing for grounds on which a person may not be 
discriminated against, defining the concept ‘equal protection of the law’ and expanding the 
circumstances in which a person may approach court when his or her right has allegedly 
been violated. The purpose of this article is to analyse the jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeal dealing with the above-mentioned endeavours and suggest 
ways in which the right to equal protection of the law may be better protected in Seychelles. 
The author will start with the definition of discrimination. 
 
Defining ‘equal protection of the law’ and ‘discrimination’ and giving the grounds on which a 
person may not be discriminated against Unlike the constitutions of Uganda15 and 
Mauritius,16 for example, the Constitution of Seychelles does not define the term 
‘discrimination’. The Constitution does not also define or describe what ‘equal protection of 
the law’ means. The task to give meaning to these phrases has been undertaken by courts. 
The author will first examine the courts’ attempt to define or describe the concept of ‘equal 
protection of the law’. In Bradburn & Anor v. Superintendent of Prisons & Anor case the 
Supreme Court (sitting as a Constitutional Court) held that 
 
[T]he Constitutional principles of “Equality before law” and “Equal Protection of Laws” 
emanate from two different concepts. The first is a negative concept which ensures that 
there is no special privilege in favour of anyone; that all are equally subject to the ordinary 
law of the land. All are equal before law and that no person, whatever be his rank or 
condition, is above the law ...  The second concept “equal protection of laws” is positive in 
content. It does not mean that identically the same law should apply to all persons, or that 
every law must have universal application within the country irrespective of difference in 
circumstances. Equal protection of law does not mean or postulate equal treatment of all 
persons without distinction. What it postulates is the application of same laws alike and 
without discrimination to all persons similarly situated. It denotes equality of treatment in 
equal circumstances. It implies that among equals the law should be equal and equally 
administered, that like should be treated alike without discrimination. In other words the 
equals should be treated equally.18 
 
However, the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court19 appear to have different 




Banking Corporation Ltd v. The Central Bank of Seychelles,20 the Supreme Court observed 
that ‘Article 27 provides for the right to the equal protection of the law, that is, that all laws 
are applied equally to all people without discrimination’.21 This interpretation equates 
‘equality before the law’ with ‘equal protection of the law’ and consequently blurs the 
distinction between the two as drawn by the Constitutional Court above. 
 
As mentioned above, the Constitution of Seychelles, unlike those of other African countries, 
is silent on the grounds on which a person may not be discriminated against. This could 
explain why some applicants have not mentioned grounds on which they have been 
discriminated against.22 As a result, courts have had to define ‘discrimination’ and also 
come up with a list of the grounds on which a person may not be discriminated against. In 
Hackl v. Financial Intelligence Unit,23 the petitioner argued that one of the sections of the 
anti-money laundering legislation was contrary to Article 27 of the Constitution and, 
therefore, unconstitutional because it granted ‘unfettered discretion to the Attorney-General 
not to take any action against any person in respect of an act that occurred outside of 
Seychelles’.24 In rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court referred to Article 27 of the 
Constitution and held that 
 
In order to claim to be the victim of discrimination under article 27 it is imperative that you 
provide a ground, or ‘any ground’ upon which you have suffered discrimination and therefore 
not offered equal protection of the law as available to other people. Discrimination denotes 
being treated differently, and often to one’s detriment, from others on the basis of a certain 
ground. The provisions set out above do not define or set out the grounds upon which 
discrimination is not permitted. It bars discrimination on any ground whatsoever without 
cataloguing a list of such grounds. If one alleges infringement of that provision it is 
necessary to assert, at the same time, the ground upon which one has suffered 
discrimination. Is it sex, sexual orientation, gender, race, colour, religion, age, height, or 
some other ground? It appears to me that the ground upon which someone has suffered 
discrimination must be articulated. The petitioner has not shown on its petition and 
supporting affidavit how he has been treated differently and to his detriment, by the-
Attorney General from persons who are in his situation or other citizens of Seychelles or those 
with dual nationality and thus denied equal protection of the law. Neither has he alleged a 
ground upon which he has been treated differently. Was it based on sex, colour, religion, 
nationality, or age? There must be a ground upon which the discrimination is alleged to 
have been based. The petitioner’s claim under this head is entirely without merit.25 
 
 
The following should be noted about the Court’s reasoning above. Firstly, for an argument 
that a person has been discriminated against to succeed, the person has to point out the 
ground on which he has been discriminated against. Because the Constitution does not 
provide for those grounds, the person has to look for those grounds from somewhere else. It 




which is not prohibited in Seychellois law or in any regional or international human rights 
instrument ratified or acceded to by Seychelles. It is submitted that in the light of the fact 
that Article 27 does not enumerate the grounds against which a person may not be 
discriminated against, the prohibited grounds should be found in Seychelles national 
legislation or in international human rights instruments ratified or acceded to by Seychelles. 
There are pieces of legislation26 and regional27 and international human rights 
instruments28 that have been ratified by Seychelles which provide for grounds on which a 
person may not be discriminated against. It should be recalled that Article 48 of the 
Constitution guides courts on the question of the approach to take in interpreting the rights in 
the Constitution. It is to the effect that 
 
This Chapter shall be interpreted in such a way so as not to be inconsistent with any 
international obligations of Seychelles relating to human rights and freedoms and a court 
shall, when interpreting the provision of this Chapter, take judicial notice of - (a) the 
international instruments containing these obligations; (b) the reports and expression of 
views of bodies administering or enforcing these instruments; (c) the reports, decisions or 
opinions of international and regional institutions administering or enforcing Conventions 
on human rights and freedoms; (d) the Constitutions of other democratic States or nations 
and decisions of the courts of the States or nations in respect of their Constitutions. 
 
Article 48 gives Seychellois a very large pool from which to draw authorities when 
interpreting the rights in the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that Article 48 is only 
applicable when the interpretation of a constitutional provision is in issue.29 However, the 
application of Article 48 is not without its challenges. In Platte Island Villa Resort Ltd v. 
EME Management Services Ltd,30 the Court of Appeal held that 
 
Interestingly, the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles makes special mention of the 
doctrine of judicial notice in its Article 48 which provides that the rights enshrined in 
Chapter III shall be interpreted in such a way as not to be consistent with any international 
obligations of Seychelles relating to human rights and freedoms and a Court shall, when 
interpreting the provision of this Chapter, take judicial notice of the Constitutions of other 
emocratic States or nations in respect of their Constitutions ...  The only difficulty with the 
application of this provision is how should the courts take judicial notice in any particular 
case that such and such a country is a democratic state.31 
 
The Court of Appeal held that Seychellois courts refer to the decisions of courts from other 
countries ‘not for the purposes of precedents but for the sake of taking judicial notice 
thereof’.32 Relying on Article 48,33 Seychellois Courts have referred to regional and 
international human rights in interpreting the rights in the Constitution including the right to 
freedom from discrimination.34 For example, in Gill v. Registrar of Political Parties,35 




refusing to register a political party whose main objective was to propagate racial 
discrimination in Seychelles. In substantiating its judgment, the Court reasoned that 
 
The purpose or object of [the political party in question] is not only unlawful and 
inconsistent with the Constitution and other laws of Seychelles but also it is repugnant to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights 
and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set out therein, without distinction 
of any kind, in particular as to race, colour or national origin. All human beings are equal 
before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law against any discrimination and 
against any incitement to discrimination. Any doctrine of superiority based on racial 
differentiation is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous, 
and there is no justification for racial discrimination, in theory or in practice, anywhere; the 
discrimination between human beings on the grounds of race, colour or ethnic origin is an 
obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations among nations and is capable of disturbing 
peace and security among peoples and the harmony of persons living side by side even 
within one and the same State; the existence of racial barriers is repugnant to the ideals of 
any human society and civilization.36 
 
 
In this case, the Court limits the grounds on which the person may not be discriminated 
against to those enumerated in international human rights instruments. In Brioche & Ors v. 
Attorney-General & Anor,37 the Supreme Court referred to Article 27 of the Constitution 
and held that 
 
Equal protection is often invoked in respect of a person or groups of people who are denied 
certain rights and freedoms in preference to other persons on some clear ground as the basis 
for different treatment. The ordinary grounds of discrimination being race, gender, sex, 
religion, colour, age, disability, or any other ground. Contravention of art 27 would have to be 
linked not only to a denial of a right or freedom under the charter to the petitioners which 
another similarly situated person or persons are allowed to enjoy on account of a ground 
such as race, gender, sex, religion, colour, age, political or other opinion or persuasion, 
language, ethnicity, national or social group or any other recognisable ground.38 
 
In his separate concurring judgment in In Roger Mancienne v. The Attorney General,39 
Venchard J.A held that The objection raised by [the appellant’s lawyer that the relevant 
piece of legislation was discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional for allowing the 
executive to grant immunity from prosecution to some foreign investors] is misconceived. It 
stems from the erroneous belief that Article 27 of the Constitution creates an absolute 




impinges on the fundamental rights of the citizen enshrined in the Constitution or on grounds 
of sex, race or religion. The appellant does not however invoke any of these grounds.40 
 
The above jurisprudence shows different grounds on which a person may not be 
discriminated against are mentioned in different judgments. It is argued that it would be 
extending the ambit of Article 27 too far to interpret it as accommodating any ground in the 
world against which a person may not be discriminated against. Seychelles may not be at 
that stage where discrimination based on some grounds should be prohibited. For example, 
the Court’s holding that sexual orientation is one of the grounds against which a person 
may not be discriminated is not supported by Article 32 of the Constitution which prohibits 
same-sex marriages.41 The second point to note about the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hackl v. Financial Intelligence Unit42 is that the Court attempts to define discrimination 
as ‘being treated differently, and often to one’s detriment, from others on the basis of a 
certain ground’. It is argued that the above definition of discrimination would have been 
enriched had the Court referred to international human rights instruments in which 
‘discrimination’ has been defined. Apart from a general definition of discrimination, 
Seychelles is required to enact legislation that defines discrimination against women. 
While commenting on the combined initial to fifth periodic reports of Seychelles, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women was ‘concerned about the 
absence of a specific definition and prohibition of discrimination against women in all areas 
of life in the Constitution or in other appropriate legislation, in line with Articles 1 and 2 of 
the Convention’.43 In Roger Mancienne v. The Attorney General,44 the Court of Appeal 
held that 
 
[i]n terms of Article 27(1), the right to equal protection of the law inheres in every person. 
The substance of the right is that except as permitted by law which is in accord with the 
Constitution every person has a right to equal treatment by the law.45 
 
Alleging discrimination 
Although Article 27(1) does not enumerate grounds on which a person may not be 
discriminated against, some people have gone to court and argued that they have been 
discriminated against. Cases in which people have alleged discrimination show that they have 
adopted different approaches. In the first approach, the applicants have not mentioned the 
grounds on which they have been discriminated against. For example, in Republic v. 
Bibi,46 the applicant’s application for bail had been dismissed because of the seriousness 
of the offence (murder) he had allegedly committed. In declining to release the applicant 
on bail, the Court held that 
 
In Seychelles the offences of murder and treason were brought under the general category of 
“serious offence” so that those offenders would not be singled out for discrimination in 
terms of the right to equal protection of the law. Hence the Court is now able to use its 




possibility of an accused faced with a possibility of a sentence of life imprisonment 
absconding cannot be underestimated.47 
 
In this case, the Court is silent on the ground on which the accused could have been 
discriminated against by a judicial officer for the purpose of bail application. In Talma v. 
Michel,48 the petitioners submitted before the Constitutional Court that the government’s 
refusal to allow them to construct a hotel at one of the islands in Seychelles contravened, 
among others, their right under Article 27 of the Constitution because ‘other owners and 
developers have been granted permission to construct two restaurants’ on the same 
island.49 In their submissions, the respondents argued, inter alia, that the petitioners’ right 
to equal protection of the law from discrimination under Article 27 of the Constitution has 
not been contravened as the petitioners have not been treated any differently from the 
owners of land at [the island] in similar circumstances.50 
 
The Court found that there was no evidence to show that the petitioners had ‘suffered any 
discrimination contrary to Article 27 of the Constitution on the facts before this court’.51 
There are at least two observations to make about this case. Firstly, the petitioner did not 
mention the ground on which he had been discriminated against. Neither the prosecutor nor 
the Court paid attention to this omission. Secondly, the Court does not motivate why it came 
to the conclusion that there was no evidence that the respondent’s conduct had violated the 
petitioners’ right under Article 27. This was the case although both the petitioner and the 
respondent made submissions of this issue. One would have expected the Court to explain 
the basis for its conclusion to the effect that the facts before it did not show that the respondent 
had violated Article 27. In Brioche & Ors v. Attorney-General & Anor,52 the Supreme Court 
held that for a petition in terms of Article 27 of the Constitution to succeed, the petitioner 
must allege a ground on which he has been discriminated against.53 The second 
approach, as will be shown in the jurisprudence below, is for applicants to allege a specific 
ground on which they have allegedly been discriminated against. 
 
Locus standi to challenge discriminatory laws or programmes Article 46 of the Constitution 
provides for the procedure to be followed in challenging the constitutionality of any law that 
violates any right in the Constitution. Article 46 states that: 
1. A person who claims that a provision of this Charter has been or is likely to be 
contravened in relation to the person by any law, act or omission may, subject to this article, 
apply to the Constitutional Court for redress. 
2. An application under clause (1) may, where the Constitutional Court is satisfied that 
the person whose right or freedom has been or is likely to be contravened is unable to do so, 
be made by another person acting on behalf of that person, with or without that person’s 
authority. 
 
The Constitutional Court held that ‘[i]t is apparent on a reading of article 46(1) that it refers 




may take place’.54 In Herminie & Anor v. Pillay & Ors,55 the Constitutional Court held that 
the right under Article 46(1) of the Constitution is absolute because ‘this is not subject to any 
other provisions of the Constitution. Article 46(1) is subject to the very article itself. The 
Constitution does not further curtailed [sic] or limit the absolutism of this right of action’.56 
The Constitutional Court will not entertain an application when it is ‘satisfied that the 
applicant has obtained redress for the contravention under any law and where the applicant 
has obtained redress in the Constitutional Court for any matter for which an application may 
be made under clause (1)’.57 For a person to approach the Constitutional Court, his or her 
right should not have been ‘extinguished by statutory limitation’ or ‘time barred’ and 
he/she should follow the Court’s rules.58 Article 46(5) provides for the various remedies 
that the Constitutional Court may award. In terms of Article 46(8), if a person who appears 
before the Constitutional Court alleging a contravention of a right or risk of contravening a 
right in the Charter ‘establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proving that there has not 
been a contravention or risk of contravention shall, where the allegation is against the 
State, be on the State’.59 At least two points should be noted about Article 46 at this stage. 
Firstly, an application alleging a contravention of a right or a risk of contravening a right in 
the Charter has to be brought by the victim or potential victim or on behalf of the victim or 
potential victim. This approach should be distinguished from the one adopted in countries 
such as Uganda where such applications do not have to be brought by the victim or on 
behalf of the victim.60 Secondly, where an applicant has established a prima facie case, the 
burden is on the state to prove that there has not been a violation. This means that all the 
applicant has to do is to establish a prima facie case and then the state must prove that there 
has not been a contravention or a risk of contravention. The applicant does not have to prove 
that there has been a contravention or risk of contravention.61 However, Article 46(8) is silent 
on the issue of the burden of proof in case an application has been brought against a 
private individual. It should be remembered that the rights in the Constitution may be 
violated by both the state and private persons.62 For example, the Supreme Court 
observed that Islam does not permit a husband to discriminate against his wife.63 It 
should also be remembered that the Constitutional Court held in Herminie & Anor v. 
Pillay & Ors,64 a person can file a petition before the Constitutional Court against any 
person who has allegedly breached the Constitution.65 It is argued that in case it is 
alleged that a private individual violated a constitutional right, it is the applicant to 
prove, on a balance of probabilities, that there has been a violation. In Ah-Man v. 
Government of Seychelles and Others,66 the Supreme Court referred to Article 27(1) of 
the Constitution and held that 
 
Where a statute is alleged to contravene Article 27 of the Constitution, which guarantees the 
right of every person to equal protection of the law, the institution of a Constitutional 
challenge by any person would not violate the Rule of standing contained in Article 




affected by such contravention. That would be the only exception to the general rule 
contained in Article 46(1). This is so as a statute is of general application. But for any 
person to challenge it, he still has to establish that that statute affects him or is likely to 
affect him.67 
 
The Court added that in cases of alleged violation of the right under Article 27, any 
petitioner can ‘champion the cause of others’ if he or she is ‘alleging a contravention of 
Article 27 by any provision of a statute’.68 This exception is only applicable to those 
alleging a violation of Article 27. It does not extend to those who allege a violation of other 
rights in the Constitution. Article 27 is only applicable where there is an allegation of 
discrimination.69 This approach was also emphasized by the Court of Appeal in an earlier 
decision.70 
 
Apart from declaring a statutory provision unconstitutional for violating Article 27 of the 
Constitution, courts may also, mero motu, declare a common law practice discriminatory 
and, therefore, unconstitutional. For example, at common law, the evidence of an accomplice 
has to be admitted with caution. In Jean Francois Adrienne & Another v. R,71 the Court of 
Appeal referred to case law from different commonwealth jurisdictions in which the issue of 
admitting the evidence of an accomplice was dealt with and held that ‘[t]o say that every 
accomplice is less worthy of belief than another witness is an affront to their dignity and 
violates the right guaranteed under article 27(1) of the Constitution’.72 Likewise, in 
Graham Pothin v. R,73 the Court of Appeal held that 
 
To draw a distinction between a vulnerable witness who recants the version at the very 
beginning of evidence or refuses to speak and a vulnerable witness who recants the version of 
evidence given in examination-in chief; both in cross-examination and re-examination 
would amount to discrimination between accused persons facing prosecutions [sic] and 
would be in violation of article 27 of the Constitution which guarantees to every person 
“the right to equal protection of the law without discrimination.” No trial court could or 
should in our view substitute its opinion contrary to what a victim has testified, to convict an 
accused. A person is convicted on the evidence before the court and depending on its 
credibility and the weight that could be attached to it.74 
 
The Supreme Court, if it is of the view that a person’s right to equal protection of the law has 
been violated by a piece of legislation, may advise that person to challenge the 
constitutionality of that legislation before the Constitutional Court. For example, in 
Mervin Jezabel Barbe v. Chief Officer of Civil Status,75 the applicant was born male and 
after undergoing a medical procedure, changed his sex from male to female. He applied to 
the Registrar of Civil Status to change his birth certificate to indicate his new status. The 




challenged the Registrar’s decision before the Supreme Court. In dismissing the application, 
the Court held that 
 
[W]e acknowledge the plea and plight of the Appellant to have his change of gender 
recognised. To that extent we recommend to the Legislature to consider whether in the 
Seychelles of today there is a justification for the recognition of gender change, at least in 
conformity with the Charter of Human Rights in our Constitution .. . Article 27(1) provides for 
equal protection under the law and in particular 27(2) states: ...  The Appellant may also 
consider pursuing the matter in the Constitutional Court along those lines and/or in the 
alternative in terms of the breach of her inherent right to the respect of her private life and 
dignity.76 
 
The Court’s reasoning should be understood against the background that in Seychelles, it 
is only the Constitutional Court and the Court of Appeal with jurisdiction to find that 
legislation or conduct contravenes the Charter of rights.77 
 
Permissible discrimination 
Article 27(2) of the Constitution provides that clause 1, which prohibits discrimination, does 
‘not preclude any law, programme or activity which has as its object the amelioration of the 
conditions of disadvantaged persons or groups’. This is what is referred to as affirmative 
action in the constitutions of some African countries such as South Sudan,78 Sudan,79 
Uganda,80 Kenya,81 Zimbabwe82 and Namibia.83 In simple terms, in Seychelles, there 
are two circumstances in which discrimination is permissible: if the law or conduct ‘is 
necessary in a democratic society’, under Article 27(1); or if the law, programme or activity 
has the object of ameliorating the conditions of disadvantaged persons of groups, under 
Article 27(2). The first permissible ground, the one under Article 27(1), that is, where the 
programme, activity or law ‘is necessary in a democratic society’ is broader than the second 
ground (the one under Article 27(2)). For the programme, activity or law to be constitutional 
under the second test, it has to be shown that it is aimed at achieving the one and only 
purpose: ameliorating the conditions of disadvantaged persons or groups. It has to be proved 
that the people or group in question are still disadvantaged and that the measures in 
question are needed to ameliorate their condition. Under the first ground, all that has to be 
shown is that the discriminatory law or activity is ‘necessary in a democratic society’. In 
Roger Mancienne v. The Attorney General,84 in which the applicant challenged the 
constitutionality of a piece of legislation which granted foreign investors immunity from 
prosecution for some offences on the ground that it was discriminatory because the same 
immunity was not granted to local investors, the Court of Appeal referred to Article 27(1) of 
the Constitution and held that 
 
The true purport of the equal protection provisions of Article 27 of the Constitution and 
similar provisions in other Constitutions is prone to be lost in rhetorics [sic] and emotive 




However, now, equal protection clauses have extended beyond the racial discrimination 
origins that gave them popularity. A much clearer approach to understanding and applying 
Article 27 of the Constitution is to understand the true meaning and purport of its provisions 
as can be gathered from its text interpreted with the aid of the interpretation guidelines 
contained in the constitution itself.85 
 
The Court added that 
 
Article 27(1) guarantees a general right of equal protection of the law. Its plain meaning is 
that all persons must have equal access to law’s benefits and privileges and be equally 
subject to its obligations. In practical and meaningful terms, equal access must be read as 
equal opportunity of access. This, unqualified, means that the state either by executive or 
legislative act must not put one person at an advantage over the other or another at a 
disadvantage to which the other is not subject. The exception to the generality of the 
guarantee of equality which permits differential treatment (discrimination) “as is necessary 
in a democratic society” is an acknowledgement that absolute equality is unattainable. 
However, discrimination to be acceptable must be trammelled along certain lines. There 
are discriminations which by current universally accepted norms can never be judged in a 
democratic society. Examples of such are those based on race or religion and those which 
impinge on fundamental rights of personal liberty and freedom.86 
 
Discriminatory legislation which cannot be justified as ‘necessary in a democratic society’ 
will be declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. In Roger Mancienne v. The 
Attorney General,87 the Court of Appeal held that 
 
In the context of Article 27 of the Constitution and permissible discrimination and in 
fashioning a test of acceptable differentiation, the word “necessary” has been used to 
describe a factor that must be present. The word “necessary” is not used in the absolute as 
indicating something that cannot be done without, but something useful to the promotion of 
an end or an objective .. . Whether the context of Article 27 of the Constitution or as a test of 
constitutionality of a disputed classification the word “necessity” should be understood in the 
mitigated, rather than in the absolute, sense.88 
 
In Seychelles National Party & Ors. v. Government of Seychelles & Anor. // Dhanjee v. 
Michel & Anor,89 the petitioners challenged the constitutionality of statutory provision90 
which prohibited victims of police action at public gatherings from seeking any redress 
against the police. In holding that the statutory provision in question was unconstitutional, 
the Constitutional Court observed that 
 
The only reasonable objective for this provision is that it is designed to enable policemen 
and women to be able to fulfil their duties without concern about being held responsible for 




necessary limitation of liability in a democratic country. The police are able to use their 
usual police powers, including the use of force, where reasonable and necessary, and the 
power to arrest. If they exceed these powers, and cause damage to private persons or their 
property, this should be able to be brought to a courtroom for a judge to decide on whether 
the individual is entitled to claim compensation. We therefore, find that this blanket 
immunity is not necessary in a democratic society.91 
 
The second ground, under Article 27(2), could also be easily collapsed in the first one, under 
Article 27(1). This is because it is necessary in a democratic society to pass laws or implement 
programmes aimed at ameliorating the conditions of people who are disadvantaged. 
Regional and international human rights bodies such as the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights,92 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights93 and the 
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Rights of Women94 
have also supported affirmative action measures. 
 
The Court of Appeal appears to be of the view that the yardstick to be used in 
determining whether the law passed in terms of Article 27(1) is discriminatory is not 
whether the law is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ but rather whether it is in line with the 
Constitution. In Roger Mancienne v. The Attorney General,95 the Court of Appeal held 
that 
 
[i]n terms of Article 27(1), the right to equal protection of the law inheres in every person. 
The substance of the right is that except as permitted by law which is in accord with the 
Constitution every person has a right to equal treatment by the law.96 
 
It is submitted that this interpretation narrows that ambit of Article 27(1). This is so because 
of the fact that not every constitution embodies the principles of a ‘democratic society’. 
 
In the combined cases of Azemia v. R and Napoleon v. R,97 in which the appellants 
challenged the constitutionality of a Penal Code provision which required courts to 
impose minimum sentences on those convicted of serious offences on the basis that it 
discriminated against them and therefore violated Article 27 of the Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court explained the circumstances in which discrimination may be 
permissible under Article 27. The Court held that 
 
Article 27 permits reasonable classification which necessarily causes distinction or 
discrimination between persons so classified and others. The basis of classification being 
inequality, mere inequality alone is not forbidden. Dissimilar treatment does not necessarily 
offend the guarantee of equality in Article 27. What is prohibited is invidious or hostile 
discrimination which is arbitrary, irrational and not reasonably related to a legitimate 





The Court added that ‘[h]ence what is prohibited is discrimination of persons in one class or 
similarly circumstanced. Thus, those who stand in substantially the same position in respect 
of the law should be treated alike’.99 The Court concluded that 
 
As a nation develops and expands, social, economic and political changes become imperative. 
Hence classification becomes necessary to administer various spheres of activities of the 
state. However, the provisions of Article 27 cannot be applied with mathematical 
precision and perfect equality. Similarity, rather than identity treatment is what is 
expected.100 
 
Therefore, in the light of the Court’s ruling, Article 27 permits classification. In Roger 
Mancienne v. The Attorney General,101 the Court of Appeal held that the contentions 
against classification ‘can be subsumed under the rules against arbitrariness and 
unreasonableness’.102 The Court gave detailed criteria that have to be used to assess 
whether the classification is permissible.103 In Bouchereau & Anor v. Superintendent of 
Prisons & Anor,104 in which the petitioners alleged that a piece of legislation which 
prohibited prison officials from granting remission of sentences to offenders convicted of 
dealing in drugs was discriminatory and therefore contrary to Article 27 of the Constitution, 
the Constitutional Court, in dismissing the petition, held that The classification of such 
persons based on the serious nature of the offence including offences under the Misuse of 
Drugs Act and differentiating between them and those other persons committing less 
serious offences is reasonable in the circumstances and would in the view of this court 
achieve the objective of the amendment which is to serve as a deterent [sic] to persons dealing 
in drugs. Therefore this court is satifisfied [sic] that the classification of persons set out in 
the law .. . is acceptable and not discriminatory in nature as contended by learned counsel 
for the petitioner .. . .105 
In Seychelles National Party & Ors. v. Government of Seychelles & Anor. // Dhanjee v. 
Michel & Anor,106 the Constitutional Court held that a piece of legislation will be contrary 
to Article 27 of the Constitution and therefore unconstitutional if it permits ‘discrimination 
with no checks on the Minister’s discretion’.107 The Court also found that legislation which 
empowers a senior government official to either allow or disallow citizens to organize 
meetings or processions in public places ‘with no intelligible criteria on how any such 
differentiation would be acceptable’ is capable of being invoked discriminatorily and 
therefore contrary to Article 27 of the Constitution.108 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, the author has demonstrated the measures being taken by the courts in 
Seychelles to protect the right to freedom from discrimination. This discussion has 
shown, inter alia, that although Article 27 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination, it 
does not enumerate the grounds on which a person may not be discriminated against. Courts 




However, courts do not refer to any treaty or law as the basis of those suggested grounds. It is 
recommended that the Constitution may have to be amended to enumerate the grounds on 
which a person may not be discriminated against. This would be in line with the 
constitutions of other African countries such as South Africa, Uganda, Mauritius, Kenya and 
Zimbabwe. Some of the grounds that may be included in the Constitution are mentioned by 
the courts in the cases discussed above and others have been suggested by other states 
under the Universal Periodic Review mechanism109 and international human rights bodies 
such as the Committee on the Rights of the Child.110 Clearly stipulating the grounds 
upon which a person may not be discriminated against would enable the courts to assess 
whether or not a given piece of legislation is discriminatory in the light of an enumerated 
ground(s) and would also enable the petitioners to know exactly which arguments to advance 
in court. Jurisprudence from some African countries such as Kenya,111 Zimbabwe,112 
Uganda113 and South Africa114 show that those challenging discriminatory laws or policies 
have clearly stated the constitutional grounds against which they have been discriminated 
against. The existence of clear grounds upon which a person may not be discriminated 
against would also enable the legislature to know which conduct or activities to regulate and 
how to do so. 
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